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Imagine a public high school graduation ceremony. The
graduates wait expectantly as the valedictorian mounts the
podium to give her address. "Fellow graduates, parents, teachers,
faculty, and members of the school board," she begins. Suddenly
she sneezes. The graduating class speaks as one: "God bless you!"
Although rooted in fact, this story has gained mythical
stature.' To some, it illustrates the determination and devious-
ness of those intent on forcing religion into the public schools. To
others, it demonstrates the absurdity in attempting to erase all
religious references from public school life. While the story is
frequently related as a joke, analyzing the constitutionality of
such student-initiated religious expression is no laughing matter.
Few legal issues provoke more controversy than religious
expression in the public schools. The ACLU reports that of all the
cases it handles, only death penalty and school prayer issues
regularly elicit anonymous death threats.2 And the Supreme
Court's various rulings on religion in public schools, rather than
bringing order to the area, have only added confusion to the
controversy.
This Comment seeks to dispel the confusion surrounding
student-initiated religious expression. Drawing on two recent
Supreme Court cases, Board of Education v Mergens' and Lee v
Weisman,4 this Comment will argue that while the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech generally protects student
religious speech in the public school setting, the Establishment
Clause prohibits organized religious exercises at public school
events unless they are held at events that students voluntarily
t B.A. 1991, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of Chicago.
1 The incident occurred at a high school in Yucca Valley, California, in 1991. The in-
cident gained notoriety after it was reported by Paul Harvey. See Paul Harvey, The
Sneeze Heard 'Round the World, San Gabriel Valley Trib (Oct 14, 1991).
2 See Oskar W. McConkie and Michele A. Parish, Is Graduation Prayer Constitution-
al? Pro/Con, 4 Utah Bar J 18, 19 (1991).
3 496 US 226 (1990).
4 112 S Ct 2649 (1992).
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attend in order to participate in a religious exercise. Section I
outlines the Supreme Court's school prayer jurisprudence, con-
centrating on Mergens and Weisman. Section II explores the
range of student-initiated religious expression in the public
schools today. Section III analyzes Mergens and Weisman, con-
cluding that these cases, taken together, generally permit speech
about religion in the public schools but prohibit organized reli-
gious exercises unless student attendance is completely volun-
tary. Finally, to determine the precise parameters of permissible
student religious expression under the Establishment Clause,
Section IV applies this distinction-rooted in the differences
between speech about religion on the one hand, and actual
worship on the other-to various student-initiated religious
expression controversies.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S SCHOOL PRAYER JURISPRUDENCE
Historically, the Supreme Court has examined religious ex-
pression in the public schools with exacting scrutiny. Indeed, the
Court has found most forms of religious expression in public
schools unconstitutional. In its first school prayer case, Engel v
Vitale, the Court struck down a required daily prayer.5 In subse-
quent cases, the Court struck down statutes mandating readings
from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the start
of each school day,6 requiring the posting of the Ten Command-
ments in every classroom,7 and authorizing a moment of silence
for "meditation or silent prayer" at the start of each school day.8
More recently, the Court held unconstitutional a graduation
prayer conducted at the behest of a middle school principal
In most of these cases, the Court has found the religious
practice unconstitutional after analyzing it under the familiar
test from Lemon v Kurtzman."° Under the Lemon test, a statute
or practice violates the Establishment Clause if it is motivated by
a nonsecular purpose, its primary effect is to advance or prohibit
religion, or it fosters excessive government entanglement with
religion.11 The Lemon test is widely considered to be extraordi-
5 370 US 421 (1962).
6 Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963).
Stone v Graham, 449 US 39 (1980).
S Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985).
O Lee v Weisman, 112 S Ct 2649 (1992).
10 403 US 602 (1971).
"' Id at 612-13.
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narily malleable and even hostile to religion, and thus it is hard-
ly surprising that most religious exercises in public schools have
failed to pass it. 2
In the recent case of Lee v Weisman, the Court declined to
apply the Lemon test,"3 yet it still held a graduation prayer at a
public middle school unconstitutional.'4 In Weisman, a high
school principal decided that a clergyman would lead a gradua-
tion prayer, selected a rabbi, and advised him as to the prayer's
content. 5 The Court concluded that the principal, acting as a
state official, had directed the performance of a formal religious
exercise and that attendance at this state-sponsored religious
activity was "in a fair and real sense obligatory" for students. 6
Although students need not attend graduation to receive a diplo-
ma, a student's "voluntary" absence would require her to "forfeit
all of those intangible benefits [of family celebration and commu-
nity recognition] which have motivated [her] through youth and
all her high school years."'7 The Court compared the graduation
ceremony to a classroom, where the risk of compulsion is high. 8
12 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 685, 685-86 (1992) ("The Lemon test is
largely irrelevant or indeterminate when applied to most serious establishment issues.");
Comment, A Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony Kennedy's Dissent in
Allegheny, 26 Tulsa L J 107, 125 (1990) ("Lemon has the effect of being hostile to religious
expressions .... ."). The Lemon test has, of course, been severely criticized by several
members of the Court as well. In Lee v Weisman, Justice Scalia opined in dissent that
"[t]he internment of [Lemon] may be the one happy by-product of the Court's otherwise la-
mentable decision." 112 S Ct at 2685.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v Grumet, 114 S Ct 2481
(1994), the Court held unconstitutional the New York legislature's creation of a separate
school district for the Satmar Hasidim along the boundaries of their exclusively Satmar
village. The plurality failed even to mention the Lemon test, leading Justice O'Connor to
note with approval that "the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is well under-
way." Id at 2500 (O'Connor concurring in part).
The Court has recently held, however, that "Lemon, however frightening it might be
to some, has not been overruled." Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 113 S Ct 2141, 2148 n 7 (1993). Lower courts, uncertain of what standard to
apply, generally still use the Lemon test. See, for example, Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State v Grand Rapids, 980 F2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir 1992); Berger v
Rensselaer Central School Corp., 982 F2d 1160, 1169 (7th Cir 1993), cert denied 113 S Ct
2344 (1993); Kreisner v San Diego, 1 F3d 775, 780 (9th Cir 1993); Otway v City of New
York, 818 F Supp 659, 662-64 (S D NY 1993). In Grumet, all three lower courts had relied
on the Lemon test in deciding the case. 114 S Ct at 2515 (Scalia dissenting).
1 Specifically, the Court found it could "decide the case without reconsidering the
general constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to accommodate religion
are measured." Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2655.
14 Id at 2649.
'5 Id at 2652.
16 Id at 2655.
17 Id at 2659.
" Id at 2660. See also Engel, 370 US at 430 (holding sponsorship of an official prayer
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To reach its holding, the Court applied a "coercion test" rath-
er than the much-maligned Lemon test. The middle school
principal's actions, the Court determined, violated the constitu-
tional principle that the government may not "coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act
in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.' ""9 The Court recognized that a dissenter like the
petitioner in Weisman has little choice but to stand respectfully
and silently during a graduation prayer. 0 Such action, the
Court noted, indicates participation in the prayer, and "[t]he
Constitution forbids the State to exact religious conformity from
a student as the price of attending her own high school gradua-
tion."2 The Constitution forbids the state not only from coercing
participation in religious exercises, but also from coercing the
mere appearance of participation: 'What matters is that, given
our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could
believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or
approval of it. "' The coercion analysis thus asks whether the
State has coerced participation or the appearance of participation
in a religious exercise.
The Supreme Court has not always ruled against religious
expression in the public schools, however. In Board of Education
v Mergens, the Court upheld the right of a student prayer group
to use school facilities during noninstructional time to the same
extent other student groups could use school facilities.' Mergens
sheds much light on the interplay between the religion and free-
speech clauses of the First Amendment in protecting student
religious expression.
In Mergens, high school students brought suit against their
school district, which had denied them access to school facilities
for their prayer club.' The students sued under the Equal Ac-
cess Act ("EAA"), which prohibits public schools that allow non-
curriculum-related student groups to meet on school premises
during noninstructional time from discriminating against any
student group on the basis of the religious, political, philosophi-
in the classroom unconstitutional).
" Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2655, quoting Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 678 (1984).
" Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2658.
21 Id at 2658, 2660.
2Id at 2658.
- 496 US 226 (1990).
24 Id at 242-43.
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cal, or other content of its speech. 5 The case thus centered
around two issues: first, whether the EAA required the school to
allow the religious student group to meet on school premises dur-
ing noninstructional time; and second, if the Act indeed obligated
school officials to grant religious groups access, whether the Act
violated the Establishment Clause."
The Court answered the first question in the affirmative,
finding that under the EAA, the school had created a limited
open forum by allowing non-curriculum-related student groups to
use the premises. Once it had done so, the school could not
discriminate against the prayer club on the basis of the religious
content of its speech.' To the second question-whether con-
struing the EAA so as to require schools to grant religious groups
access to school facilities violates the Establishment Clause-the
Court replied no. A plurality of the Court concentrated on the
effects prong of Lemon and pointed to four features of the EAA in
holding that the statute did not have the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.
First, secondary school students were likely to understand
that the school did not endorse speech that it merely permitted
on a nondiscriminatory basis. Second, the Act expressly limit-
ed the participation of school officials in prayer club meetings
and thereby minimized the risk that teachers would become
religious role models for students. ° Third, student group meet-
ings could take place only during noninstructional time, thus
avoiding "mandatory attendance requirements.""' Finally, the
broad spectrum of clubs allowed to use the school facilities coun-
teracted any possible message of official endorsement of the
prayer club.32
Thus, with Mergens and Weisman the Court has drawn a
line between permissible and impermissible religious expression
in the public schools. On the one hand, a school may not prohibit
a student group from meeting on the same terms as other stu-
dent groups because of the religious content of the group's
2s 20 USC § 4071 (1988).
' Mergens, 496 US at 231.
Id at 246-47
28 Id at 248-49.
2 Id at 250-51.
0 Id at 252-53.
3' Id at 251, quoting Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 584 (1987). As early as Engel,
the Court explicitly held that the mere fact that the praying itself is voluntary does not
keep a practice from violating the Establishment Clause. See Engel, 370 US at 430.
32 Mergens, 496 US at 252.
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speech. On the other hand, a school may not organize prayer at a
graduation ceremony. The current controversy centers on those
cases of student religious expression falling between Mergens and
Weisman.
II. CURRENT RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ISSUES IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The debate over student religious speech at public school
events encompasses an ever-increasing range of issues. This
Section will catalog both the existing controversies and possible
variations thereof. In general, the various types of student reli-
gious expression have been divided into two categories: organized
prayer83 and religious speech that does take the form of a formal
religious exercise.
A. Organized Prayer
The issue of student-organized prayer principally arises in
four different contexts: graduation, school athletic events and
assemblies, baccalaureates, and "flagpole prayer."
The Court's holding in Weisman-that officially organized
prayer at graduation violates the Establishment Clause-prompt-
ed many students to organize prayers for their graduations them-
selves. Predictably, such student-organized graduation prayers
have provoked litigation, with mixed results in the lower courts.
In Jones v Clear Creek Independent School District, the Fifth
Circuit held that the school district did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause by allowing high school seniors to choose student
volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations
at their graduation ceremonies. 4 The court analyzed the school
district's resolution under the Lemon test, the endorsement
test,35 and the Weisman coercion analysis, and found no Estab-
lishment Clause violation under any of the three approaches.
Comparing the case to both Mergens and Weisman, the Jones
court held that "a majority of students can do what the State
acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer in public high
' "Organized prayer" denotes planned group prayer and has no implications for an
individual student's right to pray silently at any time she wishes.
3' 977 F2d 963, 965 (5th Cir 1992), cart denied, 113 S Ct 2950 (1993).
' The endorsement analysis asks whether a reasonable person would view the
challenged government action as a disapproval of her contrary religious choices. Id at 968.
Justice O'Connor introduced the endorsement test in her opinion in Lynch v Donnelly, 465
US 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor concurring).
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school graduation ceremonies."" In Harris v Joint School Dis-
trict No. 241, the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho reached a similar result. ' The court emphasized that the
Supreme Court's failure to prohibit all graduation prayer, despite
recent opportunities to do so, showed that the Court would toler-
ate some prayer at public school ceremonies."
In contrast to Jones and Harris, the Third Circuit issued an
injunction in June, 1993 prohibiting all prayer at a New Jersey
high school graduation ceremony even though a majority of stu-
dents had voted to include it. 9 Justice Souter, acting as circuit
judge, denied the school board's application for review and al-
lowed the injunction to stand.'
Such division among the circuits places school boards in a
quandry, subject to lawsuits from both students denied the op-
portunity to hold organized prayer at graduation and students
forced to listen to such prayer.4 Indeed, the problem is further
exacerbated by the possibility that students, intent on holding
prayer at graduation, will simply defy prohibitions against
prayer. For example, students at one Tennessee high school grad-
uation ceremony stood up en masse and recited the Lord's
Prayer.42 School administrators are thus caught in a crossfire.
Student-initiated prayer at athletic events or assemblies
presents many of the same problems as it does at graduation. It
is clear after Weisman that prayer initiated by school administra-
tors violates the Establishment Clause.' Similarly, courts have
Jones, 977 F2d at 972.
821 F Supp 638 (D Idaho 1993).
See id at 643 (noting that the Court declined the opportunity by not reaching the
issue in Weisman and by denying certiorari in Jones). Some commentators have also
inferred the Court's support for this ruling from its failure to grant certiorari and disturb
the ruling. See, for example, Ralph D. Mawdsley and Charles J. Russo, Supreme Court
Upholds Religious Liberty: Educational Implications, 84 Educ L Rptr 877 (1993).
" See ACLU of New Jersey v Blackhorse Pike Regional Board of Education, Docket
No 93-5868 (3d Cir, June 25, 1993) (no opinion issued).
o Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education v ACLU of New Jersey, Application
No A-92-974 (3d Cir, June 28, 1993) (no opinion issued).
41 Last spring Wayne Oldham, principal of a high school in Westmoreland, Tennes-
see, received letters from the ACLU and other interested groups indicating that they
would sue him if he permitted a student to initiate a public prayer at graduation. School
Prayer Gaining Ground in South, NY Times A7 (Feb 21, 1994). Compare Schools Get
Around Court's Ban on Prayer, Wash Times Al (May 22, 1993) (reporting five students
sued an Indiana school district for banning prayer at graduation).
42 ACLU Sued Over Graduation Prayer, PR Newswire (June 8, 1993).
Before Weisman, at least one court had reached a similar conclusion. See Jager v
Douglas County School District, 862 F2d 824 (11th Cir 1989). In Jager, the court held the
practice of beginning public high school football games with a prayer over the loudspeaker
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held it unconstitutional for coaches to lead a team in prayer
before a game.' However, the constitutionality of student-initi-
ated prayer at athletic events or assemblies remains an open
question.
In the pre-Weisman case of Collins v Chandler Unified
School District, the Ninth Circuit held it unconstitutional for a
school to permit the Student Council to select a student to lead a
prayer at each school assembly.45 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the assembly prayer was constitutional merely because
attendance at school assemblies was optional." The court in-
stead found it problematic that "Chandler students must either
listen to a prayer chosen by a select group of students or forego
the opportunity to attend a major school function."47 While the
court's reasoning sounds remarkably like that of the Supreme
Court in Weisman, the fact that the assembly prayer at issue was
student-organized cautions against reaching the same conclusion
too quickly.
Baccalaureate services present another common type of stu-
dent-initiated prayer, although one that has rarely reached the
courts. In Randall v Pegan, a district court held a baccalaureate
service organized in the school auditorium by a nondenomina-
tional student group constitutional." The student group had
applied to rent the auditorium and had followed the rental proce-
dure established for other civic, private, or student groups seek-
ing to use school facilities during noninstructional hours.49 The
Court applied the Lemon test and relied heavily on Mergens for
the proposition that once the school created an open forum, it
unconstitutional. The school district argued that the Supreme Court's school prayer cases
were inapposite because the pregame invocations took place outside of the classroom,
because attendance at football games was entirely voluntary, and because the invocations
in question lasted only sixty to ninety seconds. The Court rejected these arguments, and
noted that the school district could avoid violating the Lemon test and still fulfill its
secular purposes of solemnizing the proceedings by using a secular invocation that did not
specifically mention religious beliefs or deities.
In Doe v Duncanville Independent School District, 994 F2d 160 (5th Cir 1993), a
student on the girls' basketball team brought suit to enjoin the team's coach from leading
the team in the Lord's Prayer before and after games and practices. See also Steele v Van
Buren Public School District, 845 F2d 1492 (8th Cir 1988) (holding that a band teacher's
practice of leading prayer before concerts and rehearsals violated the Establishment
Clause).
45 644 F2d 759 (9th Cir 1981).
41 Id at 761.
47 Id at 762.
48 765 F Supp 793 (W D NY 1991).
49 Id at 794, 796.
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could not preclude a student group from holding a baccalaureate
on the basis of its religious content."
A final example of organized prayer in the public school
setting is "flagpole prayer." Flagpole prayer is a nationwide
Christian prayer vigil in which students across the country gath-
er around school flagpoles to pray before the school day begins.5 '
A threshold issue in such a situation is whether "See-You-at-the-
Pole" prayer vigils should be considered student initiated for
purposes of constitutional analysis. Organizations such as the
Southern Baptist Convention, Campus Crusade for Christ, and
the Christian Broadcasting Network maintain that such prayer
presents no Establishment Clause problem precisely because
students both initiate and lead the prayers.52 Others are skepti-
cal, calling the movement "a well-choreographed, adult-super-
vised, funded and implemented enterprise" and charging that
"[t]hese children are the lackeys of a well-oiled political ma-
chine .... 53
Thus, although Lee v Weisman clearly rules out the possibili-
ty of administrator-organized prayer at official school events or
activities, the constitutionality of student-organized prayer in
similar settings remains unclear. Students might attempt to
organize prayers at any number of school functions; the preced-
ing discussion has identified the four settings in which students
most regularly attempt to organize and conduct prayer. The
principal question courts must confront in such instances is
whether the simple fact that the prayer is organized by students
renders the prayer constitutional, notwithstanding the fact that
the prayer remains associated with an official school event and
often involves a captive audience of students.'
50 Id at 795-96.
" See Gayle White, Metro Kids Take Part in Flagpole Prayer Meeting; Students'
Actions Praised, Criticized, Atlanta Const B2 (Sept 16, 1993); Editorial, Schools Shouldn't
Try to Prevent 'Flagpole" Prayer, Newsday 38 (Sept 20, 1993).
' See White, Metro Kids Take Part in Flagpole Prayer at B2.
5 Id.
" In the absence of clear guidance from the courts, several southern states have ini-
tiated legislative responses to the judicial controversy over student-organized prayer.
Such legislative initiatives might themselves raise Establishment Clause concerns,
possibly violating the secular-purpose prong of Lemon. See Wallace v Jaffree, 463 US 38
(1985) (holding an Alabama statute authorizing a period of silence in public schools for
meditation or prayer unconstitutional because it lacked any secular purpose). This Com-
ment leaves such an analysis to later writers.
Arkansas and Tennessee have passed laws allowing students to lead prayer at
graduation ceremonies and other school events. The Tennessee law states that "non-
sectarian and non-proselytizing voluntary benedictions, invocations or prayers, which are
1994] 1573
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B. Religious Speech by Individual Students
The religious speech of individual students at public school
events, or in the classroom itself, presents Establishment Clause
issues distinct from those implicated in the organized prayer
context. Religious speech by individual students occurs when a
student speaks about religion, distributes religious literature, or
displays religious artwork in school. Cases involving such student
religious speech arise most frequently when a school district or
an individual teacher-seeking to avoid violating the Establish-
ment Clause-prohibits a student from delivering a speech or
presentation containing a religious message, and the student
asserts a right to deliver the message under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. In most of these cases, courts
have found that the school's or teacher's Establishment Clause
worries or "legitimate pedagogical concerns" outweigh the
student's free-speech rights, and thus permit the restriction of
student religious speech.
One common example of student-initiated religious expres-
sion occurs when a student speaker, often chosen on the basis of
some secular criterion such as grade-point average, wishes to
include religious remarks in her speech at a public school event.
In Guidry v Calcasieu Parish School Board, the class valedictori-
an planned to give "thanks to her Savior, Jesus Christ, and ex-
hortations to her classmates that a decision to believe in Jesus
was the most important thing in life."5 The principal reviewed
her speech and told her she could not give it. In response the
student brought suit against the school district so that she might
initiated and given by a student volunteer or student volunteers may be permitted on
public school property during school-related noncompulsory student assemblies, school-
related student sporting events, and school-related commencement ceremonies." 1993
Tern Pub Acts 534, § 1(c), amending Tenn Code Ann § 49-6-1004 (1993). A challenge to
this statute is currently moving through the federal courts. See Editorial, Why Our
Schools Shouldn't Have a Prayer, Wash Post 8 (Apr 3, 1994).
The Arkansas law amended its Equal Access Act to allow student-planned gradua-
tion ceremonies and pregame activities at sports events. Ark Stat Ann § 6-21-202(3)
(1993). See also Laurel Shaper Waiters, Schools Across US Grapple with Prayer at Gradu-
ation after Supreme Court Ruling, Christian Sci Monitor 1 (June 3, 1993).
On April 8, 1994, the Mississippi governor signed a similar bill, amending Miss Code
Ann § 37-13-4 (1993). The Mississippi law allows "non-sectarian and non-proselytizing
voluntary benedictions, invocations or prayers, which are initiated and given by a student
volunteer" at school-sanctioned events. See Mississippi OKs Student-Led School Prayer,
Chi Trib 11 (April 9, 1994). Georgia is also considering similar legislation. See Ronald
Smothers, School Prayer Gaining Ground in South, NY Times A12 (Feb 22, 1994).
' No 87-2122-LC (E D La, Feb 22, 1989), reported in 9 Religious Freedom Rptr 118
(1989), affd on alternative grounds, Guidry v Broussard, 897 F2d 181 (5th Cir 1990).
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give her valedictory. A magistrate granted summary judgment
for the school district, stating that the speech would have the
primary effect of advancing religion since allowing the speech to
be given, after it had been reviewed, would necessarily signal the
school's approval and thus violate the Establishment Clause." A
similar situation could arise any time a school allows an individ-
ual student to address a group of students at a football game,
assembly, or any other school function.
Establishment Clause issues also arise when students at-
tempt to distribute religious literature or messages at public
schools.57 The concern commonly voiced about such student reli-
gious speech-and often used by schools to justify restrictions on
it-is that allowing students to proselytize openly by discussing
religion or distributing religious materials during school time
violates the Establishment Clause by subjecting a captive audi-
ence of students to coercive religious speech.58 The Seventh Cir-
cuit and the Middle District of Pennsylvania have both rejected
such concerns and held school policies that completely prohibit
students from distributing religious literature unconstitution-
al.59 At the same time, both courts have ruled that student dis-
tribution of religious literature may be subjected to time, place,
and manner restrictions in the interests of order and forwarding
the school's educational goals.60
56 Guidry, 897 F2d at 182.
" Religious speech issues might also arise when students wear clothing inscribed
with religious messages. In Redmon v Clay County School Board, for example, an elemen-
tary school principal, fearing an Establishment Clause violation, prohibited a student
from wearing a t-shirt with the message: "O.K, LAST TIME ... THIS IS YOUR BRAIN
[accompanied by a picture of a brain] THIS IS YOUR BRAIN IN HELL [accompanied by a
picture of a brain in a frying pan]." Underneath the picture it read: "ANY QUESTIONS?
JOHN 3:16-18." The case settled before going to trial, with the school board allowing stu-
dents to wear clothing with religious messages as long as those messages were not disrup-
tive. No 91-1080-CIVJ12 (M D Fla 1991), reported in 12 Religious Freedom Rptr 90
(1991).
' See, for example, Rethford v Norman Public School System, No CIV-91-234 W (W
D Okla 1991), reported in 11 Religious Freedom Rptr 181 (1991). In Rethford, a fifth-
grade student brought suit after the administration barred her from reading or discussing
the Bible during recess with her friends. The case settled when the school agreed to allow
the recess Bible sessions and the student agreed to refrain from communicating her
religious views to other students unless they specifically asked. Id.
" Hedges v Wauconda School District, 9 F3d 1295, 1303 (7th Cir 1993); Thompson v
Waynesboro Area School District, 673 F Supp 1379, 1392 (M D Pa 1989). But see Hemry v
School Board of Colorado Springs, 760 F Supp 856 (D Colo 1991) (holding that restric-
tions on the distribution of a religious newspaper in a high school were appropriate in
light of the nature and purpose of the nonpublic forum).
o See Hedges, 9 F3d at 1300-01; Thompson, 673 F Supp at 1387.
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Other courts, though, have found Establishment Clause and
pedagogical concerns sufficient to override students' free speech
claims. In DeNooyer v Livonia Public Schools, for example, a
second-grade student brought suit against her teacher, alleging
that the teacher had violated her rights to free speech and free
exercise by refusing to allow her to show a video of herself sing-
ing a Christian song in church as part of her "VIP of the Week"
presentation.6' Under the VIP program (designed to improve
students' self-esteem through oral presentations to the class), the
teacher chose a different student each week to bring special be-
longings from home for a type of show-and-tell. The court found
the teacher's limitation of the student's speech reasonable be-
cause the impact of the religious message of the tape on a sec-
ond-grade audience constituted a "legitimate pedagogical con-
cern" and because showing a video did not meet one of the objec-
tives of the VIP program, which was to have students make oral
presentations.62 Because the court held that the teacher's ac-
tions did not violate the student's free speech rights, it did not
reach the question of whether permitting her speech would have
violated the Establishment Clause."
Similarly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Duran v
Nitsche held that a teacher's pedagogical concerns were suffi-
ciently important to excuse an infringement on a fifth grader's
free speech rights.64 The student was required to present an oral
report to her class and prepared a report on "the Power of God."
Upon learning this, the teacher forced the student to give the
report to the teacher alone and prevented her from distributing a
survey to classmates about their religious views." The court
found this to be a permissible infringement on the student's right
to speak, reasoning that it was "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns," and that the teacher was justifiably con-
cerned that the material was inappropriate for the students' level
of maturity and inadequately researched by the student.66 Once
61 799 F Supp 744 (E D Mich 1992), aff'd as DeNooyer v Merinelli, 1 F3d 1240 (6th
Cir 1993), reh'g denied, 12 F3d 211 (6th Cir 1994), cert denied, 114 S Ct 1540 (1994).
62 Id at 751.
6 Id.
" 780 F Supp 1048 (E D Pa 1991).
65 Id at 1051.
' Id at 1054-56. Compare Settle v Dickson County School Board, No 91-0562 (M D
Tenn, July 18, 1991). In Settle, a teacher prohibited a ninth-grader from writing an
English paper on the life of Christ when the student had been assigned to write about the
life of a famous person. The district court granted summary judgment to the school board,
and the case is currently being appealed. Settle v Dickson County School Board, No 93-
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again, the court did not reach the Establishment Clause issue
presented by the defendant school district.
Finally, the public display of student artwork with religious
themes can raise Establishment Clause issues. In Joki v Board of
Education of Schuylerville Central School District, the Northern
District of New York held that a school's decision to display a
student's painting depicting a crucifixion scene violated the Es-
tablishment Clause." The student had painted his oeuvre di-
rectly onto the wall of the school auditorium as part of a program
allowing students planning careers in art to decorate the school
with original artwork.68 The school argued that even if the pic-
ture seemed religious in nature, the fact that the picture was
dimly lit, included several unidentifiable and apparently secular
figures, and was surrounded by nonreligious pictures negated any
possibility of official endorsement.69 The court, however, conclud-
ed that the painting had the impermissible primary effect of
endorsing Christianity.0
III. MERGENS AND WEISMAN ANALYZED
While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence may appear contra-
dictory, a close study of the interplay between Mergens and
Weisman reveals that the Court relies on two guiding principles
to determine the constitutionality of student-initiated religious
expression. First, religious exercise is constitutional only if stu-
dent attendance is voluntary. Second, religious speech represents
something altogether different than religious exercise, and merits
an extremely high level of protection.
A. Mergens, Weisman, and Voluntary Attendance
Mergens stands for the principle that once a school has creat-
ed a public forum for student speech, it cannot restrict such
speech on the basis of its religious content. But this principle
cannot mean that all the practices the Court has struck down as
unconstitutional in the public school setting-prayer recited over
6207 (6th Cir 1994). The facts of the case are reported in 11 Religious Freedom Rptr 347
(1991).
' 745 F Supp 823 (N D NY 1990).
6 Id at 824.
69 Id at 829-30. Pictures of an American flag and a Revolutionary War scene sur-
rounded the disputed artwork.
7o Id at 831.
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the loudspeaker, posting of the Ten Commandments, graduation
prayer-become constitutional when organized by students.
This is true for two reasons. First, students have no general
right to speak whenever and however they wish in the public
school setting. The Court has held that student conduct that "for
any reason... materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech."7' The Mergens principle therefore applies only where
the school has created an open forum. When the school does not
normally permit student speech, the school need not permit stu-
dent religious speech. Put another way, if only school administra-
tors typically use the school loudspeaker, and they do not ordi-
narily allow students to use it, the school does not impermissibly
interfere with student speech rights by refusing to allow students
to speak about religion over the loudspeaker.
Second, and more controversially, Weisman actually curtails
students' free speech in certain instances because that case holds
that no student may be subjected to a religious exercise as a
condition of attending a school event. Recognizing this second
proposition requires an elaboration of the reasoning behind the
Court's decision in Weisman.
The Weisman Court relied on familiar principles in holding
the graduation prayer at issue unconstitutional. The Court ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of the graduation prayer according to
criteria very similar to those it employed in Mergens. First, the
Court found that-unlike the situation in Mergens-the school in
Weisman did not merely permit the rabbi's speech on a nondis-
criminatory basis. Rather, the principal chose the rabbi, asked
him to pray, and dictated the content of his prayer. Thus, the
risk that students would understand that the school endorsed the
rabbi's speech was very high.72 Second, teachers and administra-
tors were heavily involved in the graduation ceremony in
Weisman: "At a high school graduation, teachers and principals
must and do retain a high degree of control over the precise con-
tents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements,
the dress, and the decorum of the students."73 Third, whereas in
71 Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 US 503, 513
(1969). In Tinker, the Court held that a school rule prohibiting students from wearing
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War violated the students' free speech rights.
72 Indeed, the concurring opinions of both Justice Blackmun and Justice Souter found
that the school had endorsed the rabbi's prayer.
73 112 S Ct at 2660.
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Mergens the wide variety of student clubs using school facilities
effectively rebutted any notion that the school endorsed a reli-
gious club by permitting it to use school facilities, 4 in Weisman
there was no broad spectrum of graduation speech to counteract
the appearance that the school endorsed the religious prayer at
graduation. Finally, the Weisman Court found attendance at
graduation to be "in a real sense obligatory."75 A graduation cer-
emony, the Court noted, was the equivalent of instructional time,
at which attendance is compulsory.76
Understanding what the Weisman Court meant in finding
that attendance at graduation is "obligatory" is necessary in
order to apply Weisman to subsequent cases. Attendance at grad-
uation is clearly not "obligatory" in the same way that compulso-
ry education laws make classroom attendance obligatory. Failure
to attend graduation will not be met with official sanction. All a
student forfeits by not attending her graduation are the benefits
of actually attending the ceremony. Such attendance is "volun-
tary" as the word is commonly understood. The Court therefore
must have meant something different when it labeled attendance
at graduation "obligatory."
The Weisman Court confronted this issue, stating that "[the
Constitution forbids the State to exact religious conformity from
a student as the price of attending her own high school gradua-
tion."77 This does not only mean that a student cannot be forced
to pray at graduation. Since its first school prayer case, the Court
has insisted that the fact that actually praying is voluntary does
not render permissible an otherwise unconstitutional prayer.7"
Thus, in Weisman, the volition in question is not merely the
volition to attend an event like graduation, but the volition to
attend an event at which a religious exercise will be conducted.
This understanding of what Weisman meant by "obligatory"
finds further support in Tinker v Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District.79 There, the Court ruled that schools
may limit student speech where that speech causes "substantial
7 See Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S Ct 2141,
2146-47 (1993) (holding that once a school district opened a school for general after-hours
use, a ban on use for religious purposes violated the Free Speech Clause).
7 Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2655.
76 Id at 2659.
77 Id at 2660.
78 See Engel, 370 US at 430 ("Neither the fact that the prayer is denominationally
neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve
to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause ...
79 393 US 503 (1969).
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disorder" in the school or impinges on other students' rights.0
Prohibiting religious expression or prayer at events where stu-
dent attendance is "obligatory" amounts to limiting student reli-
gious speech where it is likely that other students' rights will be
infringed.81
Thus, Mergens and Weisman allow religious exercises in the
public schools where students knowingly and willingly attend the
event as a religious exercise. The cases prohibit religious exercis-
es where attendance is obligatory-that is, where students can-
not be said to be attending the event in order to engage in a
religious exercise. The three remaining Mergens crite-
ria-whether students will understand that the school permits
the religious speech on a nondiscriminatory basis, whether teach-
ers and administrators are involved and to what extent, and
whether a broad spectrum of speech counteracts the appearance
of endorsement of the religious speech-qualify this distinction
by imposing further conditions on school prayer. Even if a court
finds attendance at the religious exercise voluntary, it may use
the other three criteria to invalidate a practice. For example, a
student prayer club at which attendance is entirely voluntary
may still be held unconstitutional if a teacher organizes and
leads it.
B. Differentiating Between Religious Exercise and Religious
Speech
The Court's emphasis on whether students voluntarily attend
religious exercises at public school events signals its implicit
understanding that a religious exercise, such as prayer, differs
from speech about religion and thus warrants different treatment
under the Establishment Clause. The Court has repeatedly recog-
nized this distinction by emphasizing that various practices are
unconstitutional because they amount to "religious exercises." In
Engel v Vitale, for instance, the Court based its decision on the
high risk of coercion surrounding religious activity in the public
school setting.s2 In Abington School District v Schempp, where
' Id at 513.
"' Note that the "voluntariness" requirement for religious exercises in the public
schools is contrary to the general free speech principle that the so-called heckler's veto
does not justify curtailing a speaker's right. See Terminiello v City of Chicago, 337 US 1
(1949). See also Doe v Small, 964 F2d 611, 630 (7th Cir 1992) (Easterbrook concurring)
("If hecklers cannot silence political speech in a public forum, obtuse observers cannot
silence religious speech in a public forum.").
82 370 US at 431.
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the Court held unconstitutional a daily Bible reading in Penn-
sylvania public schools, the Court agreed with the trial court's
finding that "such an opening exercise is a religious ceremony"
and thus unconstitutional.83 In Weisman, the Court found it im-
permissible that "[sitate officials direct[ed] the performance of a
formal religious exercise .... "'
Speech about religion differs fundamentally from religious
exercise in two important ways. First, common social understand-
ing dictates that merely listening to a religious exercise is partici-
pating in that exercise. As the Weisman Court noted, a dissent-
ing student has no meaningful way to signal her nonparticipation
in a graduation prayer, barring a conspicuous protest. To sit or
stand silently is to participate in the prayer.' A religious exer-
cise may be compared to a political rally; listening is participat-
ing, whether or not the listener agrees with the speaker or en-
gages in the same mental processes as the speaker. It makes no
sense to say that 500 people attended the rally, but only 450
were actually participating. Everyone who attends a rally is par-
ticipating. Similarly, listening to a prayer at graduation consti-
tutes participation in a religious exercise, and the school may not
require such participation as a condition of graduation.
Second, speech about religion is accessible to outsiders in a
way that a religious exercise is not. A religious exercise excludes
all dissenters from the discussion by leaving no room for re-
sponse." This distinction between religious speech and religious
exercise parallels John Rawls's concept of public reason, which
requires that political decisions refer to widely accepted princi-
ples of political justice rather than to individuals' private reli-
gious or moral beliefs.
What public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain
their vote to one another in terms of a reasonable balance of
public political values, it being understood by everyone that
374 US 203, 223 (1963) (emphasis added).
112 S Ct at 2655 (emphasis added).
Id at 2658 ("There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, the act of standing
or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the Rabbi's prayer. That was the
very point of the religious exercise.").
" Professor Greene uses similar reasoning to argue against allowing legislatures to
enact legislation for the express purpose of advancing religious values. Abner S. Greene,
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L J 1611, 1620 (1993) ("lit is prop-
er to insist that law be grounded expressly in sources of value accessible to citizens as
citizens, not merely to those citizens who happen to share a faith in a separate,
extrahuman source of authority.").
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of course the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines
held by citizens is thought by them to provide further and
often transcendent backing for those values. 7
The Rawlsian duty to appeal to political values that all can
understand also implies "the duty to adopt a certain form of
public discourse."' Likewise, the prohibition on religious exer-
cises at public school events constitutes a duty to adopt a certain
form of public discourse. Religious exercises necessarily involve
one-sided discourse on comprehensive religious doctrines that not
all students share. Such exercises fail to provide a forum for dis-
course in which every student can participate. When someone
says "I believe X," giving a statement of personal belief, a non-
believer can respond, "I do not believe X, I believe Y." A sacred,
religious exercise like prayer admits of no such response because
it demands group participation and silences dissent. 9 As the
Court noted in Weisman, the dissenting student could not re-
spond to the prayer but could only maintain a respectful silence.
Because religious exercise usually admits of no response
from nonbelievers, it can cause greater harm than speech about
religion. As Justice O'Connor noted in another context, the reli-
gious exercise conducted under the auspices of the state "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community .... o Moreover, the risk of
alienation and coercion increases where schoolchildren are con-
cerned."
's John Rawls, Political Liberalism 243 (Columbia, 1993). Rawls advocates a concept
of public reason that requires political decisions to be made by reference to accepted
principles of political justice rather than by reference to individuals' comprehensive reli-
gious or moral doctrines that are not shared by all. Rawls observes that "[a]s far as pos-
sible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the principles of
justice and their application to constitutional essentials and basic justice are to rest on
the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens generdlly." Id at 225.
8 Id at 242.
' Professor Laycock suggests that prayer often enters into an otherwise secular
public ceremony "precisely because some people want a symbolic affirmation that govern-
ment approves and endorses their religion, and because many of the people who want this
affirmation place little or no value on the costs to religious minorities." Douglas Laycock,
Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 841, 844
(1992).
" Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor concurring).
91 See Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2658 ("[Tlhere are heightened concerns with protecting
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary
public schools."). See also Schempp, 374 US at 307 (Goldberg concurring); Edwards v
Aguillard, 482 US 578, 584 (1987); Mergens, 496 US at 261-62 (Kennedy concurring).
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Speech about religion, on the other hand, encourages open
discussion and allows nonbelievers to participate if they so
choose. Public schools should expose students to different beliefs
and practices, religious and otherwise, in order to promote the
tolerance and multiculturalism necessary to live in our increas-ingly pluralistic society.2 Certainly one of the greatest benefits
of a public school education is the heterogeneity of its students.
The religion clauses should not be read to require homogeneity
by silencing cultural and religious differences.
At the same time, however, no public school should require
students to attend or participate in a religious ceremony. Com-
pulsory attendance at a Catholic religious exercise, for example,
would silence cultural and religious differences as surely as a
rule prohibiting students from mentioning religion at all. Just as
it is undesirable to force religious expression out of the public
sphere entirely, it is equally undesirable to conduct religious
exercises that celebrate certain beliefs as part of public school
events attended by students who do not share those beliefs.
There is a significant difference between learning about various
religious views through speech about religion (for example, a
classmate giving a report on the importance of religion in his life,
or about the life of Mohammed) and compelled presence at or
participation in a religious exercise to which students are unable
to object."
C. Objections and Answers to the Religious Speech-Religious
Exercise Distinction
The religious speech-religious exercise distinction made a
brief appearance in Supreme Court jurisprudence in Justice
White's dissenting opinion in Widmar v Vincent.' In Widmar,
the Court held that a public university that had established an
open forum for student groups could not exclude a student reli-
gious group on the basis of the religious content of its speech.95
The majority rejected Justice White's argument that "religious
See Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 287 (Princeton, 1987).
Along the same lines, one might argue that schools should not require students to
participate in controversial secular exercises. For example, requiring children to write
pro-environment "letters to the editor" coerces their participation in a political exercise,
perhaps violating their beliefs in a much different way from merely presenting a pro-
environment view during science class.
454 US 263 (1981).
Id at 277. In Mergens, the Court held that in passing the Equal Access Act, "Con-
gress extended the reasoning of Widmar to public secondary schools." 496 US at 235.
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worship" is not speech generally protected by the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment. 6
The Widmar majority merely held that the distinction had no
bearing on whether a university could prohibit a student group
from using university facilities based on the content of the
group's speech. The analysis proposed in this Comment reaches
the same result: Whether a student religious group wishes to
discuss religion or to pray together does not affect the Mergens
equal-access principle that a school may not discriminate against
such speech on the basis of its religious content. In this context,
worship gets the same protection as speech about religion.
The Court has, however, distinguished between religious
exercise and speech about religion where the audience is a cap-
tive one. For example, Weisman held that the Establishment
Clause forbids a school from making attendance at a religious
exercise a condition of attending a public school event. 7 Hence,
the distinction remains valid as long as it can avoid the problems
pointed out by the Widmar Court.
The religious speech-religious exercise distinction has been
criticized on several fronts. First, the distinction presents an
obvious line-drawing problem. Not every religious expression falls
neatly into a category of either speech or worship. On the most
basic level, worship often takes the form of speech. And problems
persist even if a line can be drawn between communicating about
religion with other humans and communicating with a deity.
Religious music or art might be thought of as either speech with
a religious theme or worship. Furthermore, religious people
might categorize such art or music differently from nonreligious
people. For example, a religious student might consider singing
religious music a religious exercise, whereas a nonreligious stu-
dent might consider it speech about religion and not a religious
exercise.
The answer to this objection must be that any analysis of
religious speech in the public schools under the First Amendment
will present some line-drawing problems. The existence of such
problems at the margin does not render the entire analysis
faulty. Most religious speech can in fact be easily categorized as
either worship or speech about religion.
The second objection to the religious speech-religious exer-
cise distinction builds upon the first: even if the line can be
Widmar, 454 US at 269 n 6.
'7 Weisman, 112 S Ct at 2661.
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drawn by someone, courts lack the competence to make the dis-
tinction. Such line drawing would require courts to "inquire into
the significance of words and practices to different religious
faiths, and in varying circumstances," and would thus
impermissibly entangle the State with religion."8 The Court,
however, constantly distinguishes between what is religious and
what is nonreligious. 9 Since Reynolds v United States, in which
the Court upheld the conviction of a Mormon for bigamy, °" the
Court has distinguished between religious beliefs and religious
acts. That distinction clearly requires inquiry into the signifi-
cance of words and practices to different faiths and in varying
circumstances. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly singled
out religious exercises at public school events as unconstitutional
without limiting students' rights to speak about religion at such
events. 0'
A third objection to the religious speech-religious exercise
distinction lies in the fear that students may use class activities
and assignments to proselytize, possibly as part of an organized
effort to inject religion into the public schools. 2 Some have
even argued that student proselytizing violates the Establish-
ment Clause because parents who send their children to public
schools have a right to expect instruction free from religious
indoctrination.'3 But the Establishment Clause already pro-
" Widmar, 454 US at 269 n 6. Professor Laycock similarly argues that allowing
school officials to differentiate between religious speech and worship in monitoring private
meetings of student religious groups would breed "censorship of the most intrusive and
offensive kind." Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status
of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw U L Rev 1, 57 (1986).
' For example, the Court has repeatedly decided whether crbches in various public
displays constitute religious symbols. See Lynch, 465 US 668; County of Allegheny v
ACLU, 492 US 573 (1989); American Jewish Congress v Chicago, 827 F2d 120 (7th Cir
1987); ACLU v Birmingham, 791 F2d 1561 (6th Cir 1986); Smith v County of Albemarle,
Virginia, 895 F2d 953 (4th Cir 1990); Burelle v City of Nashua, 599 F Supp 792 (D NH
1984). See generally Comment, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U Chi L Rev
253, 257-59 (1994).
"0 98 US 145 (1878).
..1 See text accompanying notes 71-84.
" See generally Eugene C. Bjorklun, Show and Tell, the Establishment of Religion,
and Freedom of Speech, 84 Educ L Rptr 601 (1993). The comments of one prominent
advocate of religion in the public schools lend credence to the Supreme Court's expressed
fear of proselytization in the public schools: "Our purpose must be to spread the gospel on
the new mission field the Lord has opened-public high schools." See Rob Boston, Ameri-
can Public Schools: Mission Field USA? 45 Church & State 8 (1992), quoting Jay Alan
Sekulow, general counsel of Christian Advocates for Serving Evangelism. See also Ruti
Teitel, When Separate is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not
Belong in Public Schools, 81 Nw U L Rev 174 (1986).
103 Teitel, 81 Nw U L Rev at 178-79, 182-83 (cited in note 102).
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tects parents' rights by prohibiting teachers from proselytizing or
endorsing religion in any way. Student proselytizing, on the other
hand, is protected by the Free Speech Clause, just as students'
attempts to convince other students to join the Democratic Party
constitute protected speech. Mergens requires that speech about
religion be treated like any other subject under the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Allowing students to
proselytize also promotes tolerance and diversity in the public
schools, while still leaving room for response and discussion from
students holding different beliefs.
Furthermore, critics may overstate concerns about student
proselytization. Students generally have a limited opportunity to
speak freely in the public school setting because so much of their
time is strictly regulated for educational and disciplinary pur-
poses. Schools already place time, place, and manner restrictions
on activities like handing out religious literature and may also
impose more general rules such as prohibiting talking in the
halls."4 Additionally, teachers can avoid turning the classroom
into a "tent revival" by carefully tailoring assignments and activi-
ties to educational objectives.
The fourth objection some commentators have advanced is
that mere exposure to ideas hostile to students' religious beliefs
violates the Establishment Clause, because such exposure im-
properly influences their beliefs, while their respectful silence
might be taken as assent to these hostile ideas. °5 However, it
is neither possible nor desirable to shield students from all "hos-
tile ideas" in the public schools. Nearly every idea could be "hos-
tile" to some students' religious, philosophical, or political be-
liefs. ' 6 Furthermore, teaching such hostile ideas might be edu-
cationally necessary and appropriate in certain situations. It
would be difficult, for example, to study the Holocaust without
discussing Nazism, or study the Pilgrims without discussing
Puritanism. As an alternative to banning "hostile" speech, schools
should present it in a form that gives students an opportunity to
104 For cases treating time, place, and manner restrictions on distributing religious litera-
ture, see Hedges v Wauconda School District, 9 F3d 1295, 1300-01 (7th Cir 1993). See also
Tinker, 393 US at 513.
" See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S Cal L
Rev 863 (1988).
1 See, for example, Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F2d 1058,
1070 (6th Cir 1987) (holding that exposure to textbooks that the plaintiffs believed taught,
among other things, evolution, moral relativism, internationalism, witchcraft, and idola-
try, did not violate the students' free exercise rights).
1586 [61:1565
Student-Initiated Religious Expression
respond, insuring that religious speech does not "improperly
influence" students' beliefs.
Of course, even religious expression can be coercively and
impermissibly used in the public school setting. For example, a
teacher could exhort students to use their free time to think
about the importance of Jesus in their lives. Or, less blatantly, a
teacher could favor students who attend church or who profess a
belief in God. Any of these are clearly impermissible endorse-
ments of religion by a state actor. However, individual student
religious speech, unregulated as to content by the teacher, does
not pose the same difficulty.
A final objection to the religious speech-religious exercise
distinction is that it might allow religious groups to dominate
public discourse. However, the Court indicated in Widmar that
its Establishment Clause and Free Speech analyses might differ
if an open-forum policy resulted in religious groups dominating
the forum: "At least in the absence of empirical evidence that
religious groups will dominate [the university's] open fo-
rum,... the advancement of religion would not be the forum's
'primary effect."" 7 Thus, the Mergens principle that affords the
same First Amendment protection to student religious speech as
it does to other student speech may find an exception in cases
where religious speech dominates the forum in question.
IV. APPLYING THE RELIGIOUS SPEECH-RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
DISTINCTION
The religious speech-religious exercise distinction provides
parameters for permissible student religious expression in the
public school setting. Religious exercises, whether organized by
school officials or by the students themselves, are permissible
only when student attendance is voluntary. When attendance is
not voluntary, the risk that students will be coerced into partici-
pating in religious practices is too great. However, religious
speech does not engender the same concerns; rather, religious
speech must be accorded the same protection other student
speech receives in order to promote discussion and tolerance in
the public schools.
" 454 US at 275. In his concurrence in Mergens, Justice Marshall voiced similar con-
cerns about possible Establishment Clause violations where a religious student group is
the only controversial or advocacy-based student group at a particular school. See 496 US
at 266.
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A. Organized Prayer
Any type of organized religious exercise at a public school
event-be it a graduation ceremony, assembly, or football
game-violates the Establishment Clause.0 8 A vote by a major-
ity of the students to include prayer at such an event has the
same constitutional infirmities as would an administration deci-
sion. Indeed, Weisman itself noted that a majority preference
could not rehabilitate an otherwise unconstitutional practice:
"While in some societies the wishes of the majority might prevail,
the Establishment Clause ... rejects the balance urged upon
us.1
0 9
The Establishment Clause is concerned with the coercive
effects of the appearance of government endorsement of religious
preferences. Beginning with Engel, the Court has continually
warned that "[w]hen the power, prestige, and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the in-
direct coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing, officially approved religion is plain.""0 The coer-
cion test proffered by Weisman addresses the same problem.
The Court has not held that students must be free from all
conceivably coercive pressure under the Establishment Clause. In
Mergens, the Court noted that "[t]o be sure, the possibility of
student peer pressure remains.... ""' Thus, the "coercion" in
the coercion test is not the ordinary peer pressure adolescents
and others endure daily. Rather, the coercion to worry about is a
kind of super social pressure brought about by the appearance of
state endorsement of the majority's preference.
The coercive social pressure caused by official sanction of the
majority's religious beliefs also exists when students vote to in-
clude prayer. First, the appearance of official sanction is present
whenever prayer is conducted at a public school event. The Elev-
enth Circuit has held that when a religious invocation is given
over a sound system controlled by school officials at a school-
sponsored event in a school-owned facility, the "conclusion is
inescapable that ... the school endorses the religious invoca-
'" Attendance at assemblies and athletic events is even more "voluntary" in the
common use of that word than attendance at a graduation ceremony. Nonetheless, such
attendance is still not voluntary under the Weisman standard: all students do not attend
assemblies or athletic events for the purpose of attending a religious exercise.
109 112 S Ct at 2660.
" Engel, 370 US at 431.
.. 496 US at 251.
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tion.""' Second, the school board or the administration often
initiates and frames such debates."' Furthermore, the fact that
the administration carries out the students' decision to include
prayer at graduation is telling, for students' preferences alone do
not typically dictate school policy. If a majority of students voted
to sacrifice 100 bats at graduation, the administration would not
likely honor this preference. These concerns render a majority
student vote insufficient to quell the fear of coercion when major-
ity religious preferences are backed by official sanction. Orga-
nized religious exercises at public school events, whether initiat-
ed by school administrators or by students, remain impermissible
under Weisman because they force dissenting students to listen
to, and thus to participate in, prayer as a condition of attending
graduation ceremonies, assemblies, or athletic events."
A more difficult case arises when an individual speaker, like
the valedictorian or an outside speaker chosen by the students,
wishes to conduct a prayer as part of her speech. In this situa-
tion, the Mergens guarantee of equal access for religious speech
and the Weisman prohibition on obligatory religious exercises
appear to conflict. The conflict is actually illusory. The situation
is not exactly analogous to the typical equal access case because
graduation is not an open forum in the Mergens sense. Only one
student gets to speak, and no broad spectrum counteracts the
effects of her speech. Additionally, the event itself constrains
what a speaker may express and how she may express it, since
Jager v Douglas County School District, 862 F2d 824, 831 (11th Cir 1989).
"1 'This was not student-initiated. This was school board- and school superintendent-
initiated .... The school [system] devised a ballot [for the voting] ... ." Kristan Metzler,
Judge Bars Loudon Graduations Prayers; Rules Plans Were Not Students' Idea, Wash
Times Al (June 19, 1993), quoting Judge Albert Bryan. Gearon v Loudon County Schools,
No 93-730 (E D Va, June 18, 1993).
114 Under this analysis, Jones v Clear Creek Independent School District, 977 F2d 963
(5th Cir 1992), which permitted graduation prayer approved by student vote, was wrongly
decided. Furthermore, alternative schemes for determining when public school events may
include prayer are also unconstitutional under this analysis because such schemes subject
dissenting students to religious exercises as a condition of attending a public school event.
See, for example, Christian M. Keiner, A Critical Analysis of Continuing Establishment
Clause Flux as Illustrated by Lee v. Weisman and Graduation Prayer Case Law: Can
Mutual Tolerance Reconcile Dynamic Principles of Religious Diversity and Human Com-
monalty? 24 Pac L J 401 (1993) (proposing that school administrators choose a student
randomly from a pool that includes all of the denominations with members in the student
body and allow that student to give whatever type of invocation he wishes, religious or
otherwise, at graduation). See also Arnold H. Loewhey, School Prayer, Neutrality, and the
Open Forum: Why We Don't Need a Constitutional Amendment, 61 NC L Rev 141 (1982)
(proposing that the school day begin with a philosophical recitation chosen or composed by
a different student each day).
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common social understanding to a large extent dictates which
topics belong in a graduation speech. Individual speakers may
express themselves only within narrow parameters. Furthermore,
the school retains ultimate control over who speaks at gradua-
tion. A school is not constitutionally required to allow a Grand
Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan to speak on white supremacy even if
a majority of students voted for him as their graduation speaker.
Thus, graduation is not analogous to a Mergens-type open forum,
and the equal-access principle does not dictate the result. A
school may prohibit individual speakers from leading religious
exercises at graduation.
Nevertheless, because it is troublesome to leave censorship of
speech in the hands of school administrators,"5 a school may
meet its obligations by providing its student and outside speakers
with guidelines explaining why conducting religious exercises at
obligatory public school events is unconstitutional under Lee v
Weisman. Once a school has done so, it has discharged its duty
and all responsibility for the speech falls on the speaker herself.
Thus, school officials need not censor each speech before it is
given, or rush on stage to grab a student's microphone if she
attempts to lead a prayer.
The Weisman prohibition on religious exercises at public
school events does not invalidate all student-initiated religious
exercises. A student-organized baccalaureate service, unlike the
graduation ceremony, assembly, or football game, has the virtues
of the Mergens prayer club. Attendance at the baccalaureate is
entirely voluntary, it takes place during noninstructional time,
and teachers and administrators need supervise the activity only
minimally. Thus, Randall v Pegan, in which a student group
rented the school auditorium to hold a baccalaureate, was cor-
rectly decided."6 However, problems arise where the school
plays some role in organizing the baccalaureate. For example, if a
school permits a student group to use the normally unavailable
school auditorium free of charge for a baccalaureate service, and
that is the only event planned in conjunction with graduation,
then the school exhibits preferential treatment-violating the
Mergens equal-access principle. Such preferential treatment indi-
cates that the forum is not truly open to all student speech, and
" And perhaps ultimately impossible, since a speaker could always turn in an
acceptable speech beforehand and then say something else at the event itself.
116 765 F Supp 793 (W D NY 1991).
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Mergens prohibits such services as endorsement of religion by
school officials.
Flagpole prayer also survives Establishment Clause scrutiny
under Weisman because of its similarities to a student prayer
club or a student-initiated baccalaureate service. Students do not
have to attend flagpole prayer, teachers and administrators are
not heavily involved, and other students forego no school activity
by failing to attend. The major question here is whether flagpole
prayer constitutes a student-initiated activity at all, given that it
is organized on a national level by powerful religious groups
comprised overwhelmingly of adults. Despite such concerns, one
must presume student autonomy and voluntariness with a reli-
gious event like flagpole prayer. The Court's concept of voluntary
attendance does not leave room for second guessing each
student's individual decision to participate in a religious exercise;
once a student shows up, one must presume she wishes to be
there, even if she wishes to be there because her parents told her
to attend."7
B. Religious Speech by Individual Students
Although the Establishment Clause limits student-initiated
religious exercises to voluntary events such as prayer clubs and
baccalaureates, other forms of religious expression by individual
student speakers generally receive protection under Mergens."'
This principle applies when a student speaker makes an individ-
ual, private choice to speak about religion in the public schools.
Thus, a valedictorian who speaks about religion, as in Guidry v
Broussard, does not violate the Establishment Clause simply by
making reference to religious beliefs." 9 Similarly, student
speakers are constitutionally permitted to speak about religion at
football games, assemblies, and other school events where stu-
dent speech is generally allowed.
..7 The rights of parents to control their children's religious training are undisputed.
See Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 213-14 (1972) (holding that parents' rights to direct
"religious and educational upbringing of children in their early and formulative years
ha[s] a high place in our society"). See also Carey v Population Services International, 431
US 678, 685 (1977) (holding that right of privacy includes childrearing and education).
118 The Supreme Court has held in another context that there is no Establishment
Clause violation where the independent, private choices of individuals result in some aid
to religious institutions. See Witters v Washington Department of Services for Blind, 474
US 481, 487 (1986) (holding that the Establishment Clause did not preclude the state
from providing financial assistance, as part of a general state program, to a blind person
studying to become a pastor at a private Christian college).
19 897 F2d 181 (5th Cir 1990).
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There are two possible exceptions to this rule: first, where
schools violate the Mergens equal-access principle by giving pref-
erential or biased treatment to religious speech rather than
merely allowing it on a nondiscriminatory basis; and second,
where religious speech completely dominates an open forum."'
Otherwise, students handing out religious literature, talking
about God and reading the Bible with friends during recess, or
giving reports on the life of Mohammed and the power of Islam
all constitute permissible religious speech under the Establish-
ment Clause. As a policy matter, all are part of the type of reli-
gious discourse public schools should encourage and promote,
along with discourse on other cultural and religious beliefs and
practices.
Religious artwork by students is also best understood as
speech about religion rather than as a religious exercise, even if
it represents an act of worship to the individual artist. Art reach-
es its audience on an artistic level and the ideas expressed by it
allow debate in a way that the ideas expressed by a formal
prayer at a public school event do not. However, this analysis
depends once again on whether the school violates the Mergens
equal-access principle by giving preferential treatment to student
religious art. In Joki v Board of Education of Schuylerville Cen-
tral School District, for example, the school seemed to go beyond
merely permitting religious speech on a nondiscriminatory basis
since the crucifixion painting was one of only two student paint-
ings exhibited in the auditorium. 2' No broad spectrum of
speech counteracted the appearance of endorsement by the
school. Like religious speech in other areas, religious artwork al-
lowed to dominate a forum may violate the Establishment
Clause, whereas a religious painting displayed as part of a stu-
dent art display does not.
Thus, the Mergens equal-access principle requires schools to
afford student religious speech the same First Amendment pro-
tection that other student speech receives. As such, administra-
tors may limit or prohibit student religious speech to maintain
order in the schools. They may not give preferential treatment to
religious speech or permit religious speech to dominate a forum.
As we have seen, these exceptions make the analysis of any par-
ticular incident of student religious speech very fact-specific and
utterly dependent on context.
'o See text accompanying note 107.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Weisman indicates that
student-initiated religious exercises in the public schools are
constitutional only at events that students voluntarily attend in
order to engage in a religious exercise. Under Mergens, on the
other hand, speech about religion by individual students receives
wide protection under the First Amendment's free speech guaran-
tee, subject only to reasonable restrictions to allow schools to
maintain order and pursue educational goals.
In his dissent from the First Circuit's opinion in Weisman v
Lee, Judge Campbell stated:
If one were to ask people what are the problems of our time,
they would hardly respond that our youth and their parents
are being corrupted by over-exposure to noble aspirations of
this character. The common complaints are that 13 year old
children are selling crack; that instead of doing homework,
students are watching violent TV; that the tolerant ideals
mentioned by the rabbi are being rejected in favor destruc-
tive habits of mind and character. So what good, one might
ask, is accomplished by preventing an invocation like
this? 2
To answer Judge Campbell, the good served by prohibiting reli-
gious exercises at public school events lies in protecting children's
religious freedom and promoting tolerance of varying beliefs. One
does not teach tolerance by forcing public school students to par-
ticipate in or be excluded from school events in which religious
exercises reflecting the majority preference are conducted. Rath-
er, tolerance must be taught by allowing speech about religion in
the public schools-in classrooms, assemblies, and graduation
ceremonies, in the form of discussion or art. Such speech will
encourage a healthy exchange of ideas between believers and
nonbelievers, the kind of exchange a religious ceremony forced on
nonbelievers never will.
" Weisman v Lee, 908 F2d 1090, 1098 (1st Cir 1991).
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